SafeNVM: A Non-volatile Memory Store with Thread-Level Page Protection


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New Members in the Persistent Media




- NVMs well suited for big data
- > Can ingest high volume of data at very high velocity
- > Others (HPC burst buffer, POSIX file system) likely to benefit

* Keeton, K. "Memory Driven Computing". FAST'17 Keynote.





Non Volatile Memory (NVM)




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- Persistent
- Byte addressable
- Comparable to DRAM latency
- Denser than DRAM
- *Haris Volos, et al. "Aerie: Flexible File-System Interfaces to Storage-Class Memory," *Proc. EuroSys 2014*


- A load-store device like DRAM
- Envisioned to be used as storage media
- Lower energy requirement than DRAM
- ≻ Standardizing initiatives: G≡NZ



Persistent Data at Risk



- Same address space
- Memory corruption are common
- Persistent data in NVM at risk






Related Work

Proposal Name	Description	Issues
Linux mprotect	NVM pages change from read-only to read-write	High overhead due to TLB-Shootdown
PMFS[Eurosys'14]	NVM pages change from read-only to read-write momentarily using CR0.WP	1.Interrupt and context switching are disabled 2.Kernel-mapped only
PMBD[MSST'14]	NVM pages mapped privately during each read-write	 Interrupt and context switching are disabled Kernel-mapped only Write-window for many threads
Mnemosyne[ASPLOS'11]	User space data store	Data safety is not covered
NV-Heaps[ASPLOS'11]	User space data store	Only a subset are coverted
Write Integrity Testing [IEEE S&P'08]	Allowing pointer modification to points-to-set	 Memory/CPU overhead No Safety against escaped dangling pointer
SafeNVM (Proposed)	A Thread momentarily gets write- permission to needed NVM pages	None




Outline





Disk Based Systems and Data Safety



Block Interfaces Vs load-store interface

- Logical block address (LBA) for block devices
- Virtual address space for memory devices

File system inode as bounds checkerFile offset to LBA conversion = bounds checking



Persistent Pointers and Deswizzling


- Virtual pointers are tied to application's address space
- Sharing or loading at new address is tough
- > A mapping is required to use persistent pointers
- ➤ Swizzling
 - Virtual address to Persistent pointer
- Deswizzling
 - Persistent pointer to Virtual address
- Deswizzling implies a bound checker

Extent	Absolute address	
index	in the extent	
63	N-1	0

Persistent Pointer Layout




Outline





SafeNVM Architecture


Data Reliability Model





Data Safety Model of SafeNVM


- Equivalent to block devices
- Specialized interfaces
 - Block interface in block devices
 - Special instruction in SafeNVM
- Bound Checking
 - File System inode for block devices
 - Deswizzling of persistent pointers in SafeNVM





Thread Level Page Protection

- New Page-table and Permission-level Buffer
- TLB is changed similarly
- 6 bit Protection key => 64 protection domains
- New Hardware instruction for page access change



Permission-Level Buffer(PLB)

PL	R/W	Access Rights
R	R	read-only
W	R	Read-write


Page-access right calculation



Instruction Name	PL bit	Action	Comment
<i>set_write_access</i> (Protection Key)	0=>1	Executing thread only gets NVM write-access	Permission stays during context switch
<i>clear_write_access</i> (Protection Key)	1=>0	Executing thread releases NVM Write-access	Read-access remains with all the threads

Proposed X86_64 Instruction

Application Specific Object Store



All pointers inside extent are persistent pointers



APIs of SafeNVM


Provides memory management

> Easy to change an application to use NVM.

Library API		
statuscreate_object (incore_pobj*, objname, flag)statusdelete_object (incore_pobj*, objname)statusload_object (incore_pobj*, objname, flag)void*decode_ptr (incore_pobj*, splptr t)splptr tencode_ptr (incore_pobj*, void*, extent index)splptr talloc (incore_obj*, size, void**)voidfree (incore_pobj*, splptr t)		
System Call		
statussys_create_object (incore pobj*, objname, flag)statussys_delete_object (incore pobj*, objname, flag)statussys_load_object (incore pobj*, objname, flag)statussys_alloc_extent (incore pobj*, objname)statussys_free_extent (incore pobj*, objname)		



Outline





Evaluations

➢ Hardware changes in QEMU

- 1 bit protection key in Page Table, TLB
- I unused bit of EFLAGS as protection level buffer, part of context switch
- 2 new hardware instruction


Linux Kernel changes

- mmap system call to pass protection key
- Page table changes



Evaluations


Case Number	Issues	Effect on NVM
CVE-2010-2160	Buffer Overflow	Data Corruption
CVE-2007-1211	Dangling Pointer	Data Corruption
CVE-2007-4000	Uninitialized Pointer	Data Corruption
CVE-2008-5187	Pointer Arithmetic	Data Corruption



- > 131,072 nodes of size 128 bytes
- > 3.6% better then RAMFS for creation
- > 24.5% performance degradation for traversal discarding deserialization cost



Persistent Pointer Overhead



➢ 48% and 73% better than RAMFS.


Ignoring serialization/deserialization cost

• 7.4% and 3.4% worst than DRAM based linked-list.

*No QEMU changes involved. Measuring the overhead on Persistent Pointer.



Persistent Pointer Overhead



- > Redis LPUSH operation: Creating the list of 10 million nodes
- Redis LRANGE operation: Traversing and getting specified number of nodes (e.g. 100 in LRANGE 100) from the list.
- Performance difference is less than 1%



Conclusion

Data Safety is an important problem for NVM

SafeNVM provides required data reliability

equivalent of disk-based system



